The Cuban Missile Crisis was decided on incomplete information — U.S. commanders never knew 140 nuclear warheads were already on the island. This chapter unravels the intelligence gaps, the secret Jupiter deal, and the torpedo vote that nearly ended everything.
Audio is available on Spreaker — see link below.
On the twenty-seventh of October, nineteen sixty-two, three Soviet officers sat inside a disabled submarine being depth-charged by American destroyers. They believed a war had already started above them.
Thirteen days before that moment in the submarine, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft completed a routine overflight of western Cuba. The date was October fourteenth.
While ExComm deliberated, they were working with incomplete information. Significantly incomplete.
ExComm debated the options hard. The Joint Chiefs wanted an immediate air strike followed by an invasion.
Khrushchev's response came in a complicated form. He sent two letters in rapid succession that said different things.
October twenty-seventh was also the day Major Rudolf Anderson Jr. flew his U-2 over Cuba and didn't come back. His aircraft was shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air missile.
Now back to the submarine. Because this is the part of the story that history came closest to burying entirely.
There's another layer to this that's worth being clear about. The dominant public narrative of the Cuban Missile Crisis was shaped largely by Robert Kennedy's memoir, "Thirteen Days," published after his assassination in nineteen sixty-eight.
One more piece of the information gap deserves mention. Kennedy learned during the crisis that the United States had secretly deployed nuclear missiles in Okinawa since nineteen sixty-one.
The title of this episode isn't rhetorical. There really were men who saved the world, and they really weren't thanked.
Chapter summary auto-generated from the verified script. Listen to the full episode for the complete content.